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Comment onJames Nelson ~ "Animals in 'Exemplary' Medical Research" 
is the threat of coercion undermining the free 
giving of consent; to overcome this objection to 
the use of prisoners, scientists would have to show 
that certain rights of prisoners outside the experi-
mental situation are not violated. Analogously, to 
make the case for conscription of animals, scien-
tists would have to work to protect their rights in 
nonscientific contexts. 
Exemplary research is research which is most 
defensible ethically. Thus attention to the condi-
tions under which research might be exemplary 
is a promising route to pursue, though, as I have 
argued, the specification of those conditions is 
more difficult than appears at first. Once the 
moral status of animals as beings with inde-
pendent value is recognized, the position of 
animals in exemplary research is nonetheless, as 
Nelson has argued, ethically questionable, espe-
cially if we appeal to communal goods or obliga-
tions to the community to justify conscription. 
"Pastoral" 
Chickens don't scratch in the yard; 
their world is a crowded cell. 
No need to peck at anything, 
they haven't any beaks. 
Sow is immobilized for life; 
she's a living breakfast machine. 
The horses stand like statues of bone, 
with icicles on their hooves. 
Cow is full of penicillin; 
her baby's in a small, dark crate. 
There is no Old MacDonald, 
just a corporate plan for Hell. 
- Kathleen Malley 
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Dear Editors: 
The identification of my name under my article 
"What A Jew Should Do," in BTS, Summer, 1989, with 
the organization Jews for Jesus, struck me with the 
same hilarity Mark Twain felt reading his obituary in a 
newspaper. His response became memorable: "Reports 
of my death have been wildly exaggerated." I wish I 
could match that. My response will have to remain 
standard, though it has an historical resonance: 
I am not now, nor have I ever been, a member of or 
associated with Jews for Jesus. My organization is Jews 
for Animal Rights. Our goals and methods are tradi-
tional and available to all Jews. 
- Roberta Kalechofsky 
Jews for Animal Rights 
The Editors sincerely regret the foregoing error. 
A Re.vly To My Critics 
The nastiness of Professor Schwartz and a serious 
misunderstanding on the part of Ms. Kalechofsky do 
not inspire one to want to reply. I fear, however, that if 
I say nothing, readers will be left with the impression 
that I am unable to defend myself. Reluctantly, I begin. 
It is true that I thought Schwartz was a "reform" 
Jew but my article was not, as Ms. Kalechofsky claims, 
based on the premise that Schwartz is "reform" and 
Rabbi Bleich "orthodox." Much of my piece sketches a 
history of the development of doctrine and it is during 
that sketch that I try to make clear my basic premises, 
which are as follows. Devout Jews need nothing more 
than the Torah if they are intelligent as well as devout. 
I painted a picture of the growth of the Mishnah and 
Talmudic scholarship as the effort of certain Jews to 
usurp the right of '1ay" Jews to think for themselves. I 
drew an analogy with certain Catholic prohibitions 
upon "laymen," circa 1000 C.E., not to read the Bible. 
Implicit in my paper is the idea that there is no 
injunction in the Torah itself to take the Mishnah and 
Talmud as more holy or about as holy as Torah itself. I 
presented excerpts from classical "sages" that strike 
the unprejudiced Jew who has no axe to grind as 
absurdities on their face. Example: that we may torture 
a dead kings horse as a way of paying respect to him. 
As a philosopher, I am committed to the idea that 
people are only free when they stop slavishly accepting 
the opinions of "greater persons" and think every 
important issue through for themselves. 
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Autobiography ofa Revolutionary 
and God's response toJob: 
Does the hawk soar by your wisdom 
And stretch her wings towards the south 
Does the eagle mount at your command? 
If not now, very certainly in the near future, the 
answer to that question will be "Yes." Will the 
morning stars sing at this creation? Or do we look 
forward to it with dread, knowing - to para-
phrase Camus - that he who knows everything 
can destroy everything. 
Buber commented that in the Bible the natural 
world is created with a blessing, but the historical 
world is created with a curse. It is from the his-
torical world of injustice that Job cries out for 
vindication. It is with arguments from the natural 
world that God justifies Himself against Job's 
attacks, but it is against nature that we make our 
prolonged war; our work is cut out for a long 
time to come, and our siege-works are prepared, 
while the historical world still remains cursed. 
The most radical texts for our time may be the 
Book ofJob and that quirky, inchoate fable, "The 
Tower of Babel." 
Letters to the Editors (Continuedfrom page 210) 
These constitute the background and the premises I 
used to argue that David Bleich never even once tries 
to give us reasons why we may eat animals and exper-
iment upon them. Throughout his essay, he is content 
merely to quote "sages" and "authorities" (as he rou-
tinely refers to them) who believe abuses of animals to 
be justified. I began my essay by pointing out that I am 
troubled by words like "authority" and "official" and 
claimed they were disguises to lend weight to oth-
erwise lightweight ideas. If I am snide, as Schwartz 
claims, it is not so much directed at the sages but at 
Bleich. I hold passionate opinions about animals and I 
am not apologetic for adopting a tone of disrespect 
towards a man who thinks it is necessary to eat 
animals and "proves" his point by saying that that is 
what Maimonides believed. I explained why 
Maimonides' view was foolish even at the time he was 
writing. I am irritated at a person (Bleich) who thinks 
he can show the principle of tz'ar ba'alei hayyim (cause 
no pain to living creatures) is not violated when 
animals are made to suffer for financial benefit because 
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a "majority of rabbinic authorities" cite financial 
benefit as a legitimate exception. 
Schwartz is so upset by my mistaking him for a 
"reform" Jew that he cares not a whit about the fact 
that my review of his book was mainly positive 
although entirely negative with respect to Bleich's 
article. (Is he in black mood because I gave his entire 
book only two and a half columns while devoting four 
columns to the much shorter article by Bleich?) I am 
deeply disappointed to learn, but no longer surprised 
now that I know he is "orthodox," that Schwartz 
thinks I should show more respect for Jewish schol-
arship - entirely ignoring the thrust of my article, 
instead of rebutting it. Nowhere in his meanspirited 
letter does Professor Schwartz try to grapple with my 
arguments. Instead, he smugly takes the moral high 
ground, rapping me on my knuckles and taking me to 
task for my failure to be submissively reverent towards 
the "greats." Swelling his chest up with pride, he 
announces we should not write off people like Bleich 
but strive to make them aware of a better worldview. 
He finishes off his heap of abuse upon me and his non 
sequiturs by asking 'Well then, what should a Jew do?" 
and answering his own question with "Certainly not 
write articles with the negative assumptions and impli-
cations of Gendin." After such a tiring display of self-
righteousness at my stylistic infelicities, little wonder 
that Schwartz has no energy left to deal with the sub-
stance of my claims. 
Schwartz seems to think I should be keeping up 
with all the writings he and his opponent, Bleich, are 
producing. He says Bleich now claims that it isn't evil 
to be a vegetarian. Thanks, David, I wish I had known 
you have undergone a change of heart because up 
until now I had been having trouble sleeping. 
Schwartz thinks I should have reviewed the 1988, not 
1982, edition of his book. I reviewed the 1982 edition 
because that is what the editors of this journal for-
warded to me for review. What have you added, 
Professor? What have you withdrawn? Nobody is 
perfect; please tell us what mistakes you corrected. Or 
is the "expansion" you boast of merely a matter of 
adding more recipes? Is my criticism of your appeal to 
the Talmud, together with my supporting reason, no 
longer applicable? If so, you could have spared us your 
grouchiness and pointed to the improvements in the 
latest edition. 
-SidneyGendin 
Eastern Michigan University 
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Dear Editors: 
One would have thought that, since 1982 when 
Carol Gilligan published her work on the differences 
between male and female moral development, we 
would have been done forever with gross gender-
neutral statements about human ethical behavior and 
development. Julie Dunlap's article on ''The Ado-
lescent as Environmental Ethicist" (Spring, 1989) 
shows, however, that the problem still persists, merely 
assuming an unfortunate new twist. Although Dunlap 
cannot but acknowledge that boys and girls demon-
strate different moral attitudes, her solution is simply 
to omit studying girls! 
Dunlap does note in passing that the results of her 
study should not be generalized to the moral thinking 
of females, adding that such research is "essential to 
develop a comprehensive understanding of adoles-
cents' moral reasoning about animals." However, 
despite this token caveat, she goes on to conclude her 
piece with claims about the "normal process of 
childhood development" and the struggles of children to 
define their moral obligations" (emphasis added). 
Dunlap, moreover, apparently sees no problem in 
assigning a gender-neutral title to her boys-only 
research - Le. ''The Adolescent as Environmental 
Ethicist." Had Dunlap accurately entitled her article 
''The Male Adolescent as Environmental Ethicist" one 
would still be disturbed that girls have been excluded 
from ethical investigation yet one more time. But at 
least this title would not have claimed more for her 
study than it really is - namely, just another study 
about only boys. 
- Marti Kheel 
Feminists for Animal Rights 
Dear Editors: 
Having reviewed Daniel Dombrowski's Hartshorne 
and the Metaphysics of Animal Rights for The Animals' 
Agenda (June 1989), I was doubly interested in what 
Judith Barad had to say about the book (BTS, Summer 
1989). Our responses differ at points, but I would like 
to call attention to a rather wide divergence on a par-
ticular issue. While Barad finds Hartshorne/ 
Dombrowski's distinction between plant sentience and 
animal sentience ontologically convincing, I find it 
mystifying. Hartshorne maintains that there is more 
cosmic and spiritual value in animal life than in plant 
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life because whereas animals can feel as whole indi-
viduals, plants, together with rocks and other "inan-
imate" landscape features, can feel only in their 
microscopic parts, or "cells." Hartshorne ascribes sen-
tient indiViduality to cells and other microscopic 
entities, based on empirical science's observation that 
these things show signs of sensitivity to the envi-
ronment. At the same time he denies sentient individu-
ality to whole plants, based on empirical science's 
failure to locate a nervous system in them. Barad sum-
marizes Hartshorne/Dombrowski: "Plants, like rocks, 
are multicellular organisms, and so are sentient in their 
parts. But as a whole individual, a plant is not sentient, 
since it lacks a nervous system" (p. 162, column 1). 
This argument is confusing. For one thing, not only 
do cells and other microscopic entities show signs of 
sensitivity to the environment; so do whole plants, as 
any lay observer can note. Secondl)" if the case for sen-
tience rests upon the observation of a nervous system, 
what evidence is there that individual cells or other 
microscopic entities have one? I don't understand how 
Hartshorne can logically ascribe sentience to cells, 
based on the argument that they show signs of sensi-
tivity to the environment even though they do not 
indicate the presence of a nervous system, yet deny 
sentience to whole plants using the nervous system cri-
terion while ignoring the fact that they, too, can be seen 
responding to the environment as whole individuals. 
Why should plants, which display all the major signs 
of organic similitude to animals (the principles of cen-
trality and growth, vital cellular behavior, DNA 
structure and activity, nutritional needs, etc.) be iden-
tified in Hartshorne's, or anyone's, metaphysics more 
closely with rocks than with other, unquestionable, life 
forms? 
To repeat, on this point I differ from Barad in 
finding Hartshorne to be neither logically nor empiri-
cally persuasive; and am left wondering, once again, 
why academic philosophy, even when it is ethically 
oriented towards the natural environment, as in the 
case of Hartshorne/Dombrowski, is so petrified when 
it comes to the plant world. It is very irksome as I 
noted in my review in The Animals' Agenda, to find 
Hartshorne and Dombrowski both patronizing 
Wordsworth, whom they admire for many of his other 
gifted insights, for having intuitively imagined that 
twigs can somehow enjoy a breeze. 
- Karen Davis 
University of Maryland 
Fall 1989 
